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21 February 1958

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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
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Approved For Belease 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T009Z5A003500180001-3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 21 February 1958 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 25X Pervukhin to East Germany: Mikhail Pervukhin, longtime member of the Soviet party presidium, has been named new Soviet ambassador to East Germany, a post vacant for more than at month. Although Pervukhin has lost standing in the Soviet hierarchy and will probably be excluded from the party's top policy-making body, he is regarded as a toprank economic administrator. His appointment underscores the USSR's concern over East German problems, particularly in the economic sphere. 25X1 USSR supports Peiping on Korean issue: Peiping's evident interest in developing the Korean issue as a justification for Communist Chinese participation in international talks is given explicit support by Moscow in a Foreign Ministry statement released on 20 February. Commenting on Peiping's declaration of intention to withdraw its forces from no Korea, the Soviet statement calls for a "conference of interested states" to discuss the Korean problem. The Soviet statement indicates that the USSR will press for the prohibition of nuclear and rocket weapons in Korea. In this connection, the American Embassy in Seoul believes that the elimination of American nuclear capability in South Korea is a 25X1 primary Communist objective. i

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Peruvkhin Named Soviet Envoy to East Germany

Mikhail Pervukhin has been named Soviet ambassador to East Germany. The post has been vacant since Ambassador Georgi Pushkin returned to the USSR on 9 January.

There has as yet been no announcement concerning Pervukhin's positions of candidate member of the Soviet party presidium and chairman of the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations. He has for years been one of the USSR's top economic executives but was demoted from full to candidate membership in the party presidium last June. Recent signs have pointed to a further loss of standing in the hierarchy, and the new appointment would probably signify that he will lose the presidium post. His experience in the economic field would be helpful to East Germany, where an extensive economic reorganization is now under way.

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The Tunisian Situation

President Bourguiba is rapidly losing the support of politically minded Tunisians who criticize him for not pressing his case in the UN Security Council and for having "conceded victory" to France in accepting Anglo-American good offices. He retains, however, the unwavering support of the general public.


Widespread fear of possible French moves against Tunisia is intensified by the French demand of 18 February that Tunis cancel without delay its order to close five French consulates and expulsion measures taken against several consuls and some 500 French nationals in the border area. If France has not closed the consulates by 21 February, Bourguiba is prepared to extend to all Tunisia the "state of urgency" which now is in effect in the border provinces.

Provocative activities on the part of some French nationals and army units and failure to begin regrouping isolated French military units have created an atmosphere in which anti-European disorders might easily be incited. Several French arms caches have been discovered, and two settlers were arrested on 17 February for carrying automatic arms and a hand grenade. Feelings were further embittered on 19 February, when the local Tunisian administrator and two national guardsmen were forcibly taken to the French army post at Remada in remote southern

Tunisia for questioning.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

21 February 1958

DAILY BRIEF

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee as of 20 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that a deliberate initiation of hostilities in the Middle East is unlikely in the immediate future. Tensions in the Middle East continue to create possibilities for serious incidents.

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South Korea: The government is organizing large-scale demonstrations to protest the Communist hijacking of an airliner and its 34 passengers on 16 February. It has also showed its defiance by scheduling maneuvers by 50,000 troops near the 38th parallel, according to the press. The government has reacted to Communist China's announcement of withdrawal of its troops from North Korea by demanding disbandment of the North Korean Army and free elections in the North as the conditions for Korean reunification.

> On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee as of 20 February 1958, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that there is no evidence of Sino-Soviet intention to become militarily involved in the Indonesian situation. Continued failure to resolve the basic differences between the central government and the dissident leaders, who have proclaimed a rival government on Sumatra, is creating a situation progressively favorable for the Communists on Java. The Djakarta government has plans to move against the dissidents, but a decision for action or for a compro-

mise rests with Sukarno.

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